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different targets in the State of J&K, to a conventional type of declared war scenario. In the initial phases of the first of 1947–48, Maj Gen Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army orchestrated the infiltration of the Kabailies, who created mayhem, in looting and arson in the Kashmir Valley and at other places and tried to capture Srinagar. They nearly succeeded in their effort and could only be stalled in their tracks on the arrival of the Indian Army troops on the 27th of October 1947, a day after the signing of the ‘Instrument of Accessation’. In 1965m Operation Gibraltar with the Pakistan military disguised as civilians tried to make inroads and incite the civilian population to rebel and tie the security forces down while the Pakistani army would attack along the Line of Control, a mix of seen and unseen enemy. The 14 days war of 1971, which was fought in J&K was essentially a war with a visible enemy and then came a phase of an unseen, insular force which became difficult to identify a friend or foe and it is 16 years since, which has given birth to the concept of a proxy war or a limited war. It will now be pertinent to see a shift in the pattern of the proxy war scenario from 1989 onwards and the jig saw puzzle of the change in locations of the thrust of the will start making sense when the inputs of terrain and demography are meshed into it. The initial phase was concentrated in the Valley, with the insurgency movement gaining impetus with the kidnapping of the three Air Force personnel who were subsequently killed. The problem spread in the Kashmir Valley and the Security Forces came down heavily on them and the requirement of raising a force to deal with the problem was felt. The raising of the Rashtriya Rifles Force (RR) commenced in 1990 and now the force boasts of strength of over 60 Battalions. The then gained impetus on the higher reaches of Shamshabari Ranges in the Kishtwar – Warwan areas and though inputs on such camps were scanty, yet little action was taken to confirm reports and to deal with the situation. The focus shifted from predominantly Kashmir to Kishtwar and Bhaderwah areas of the Doda District and efforts were made by the insurgent tanzeems to become active during the second half of 1990’s, while near normalcy returned to the Valley. With the attention of the security forces now focussed in the Jammu Region, Pakistan in the guise of mujahaddin, occupied the Kargil heights and tried to cut off the only life line to Ladakh. However, with the importance attached to clearing the opposition, the Pakistani designs were neutralised and again till 2001, the overall situation improved. With some respite to the security forces and with the requirements of the tanzeems showing their prowess, it became important for their to re-charge their struggle and the focus was once again to raise the ante in the Kashmir Region with infiltration attempts on the rise in the Jammu Division. However, when the situation became difficult for the Security Forces in 2002–03, ‘Sarp Vinash’ which caught the head lines in the months of May 2003, when the Army launched ‘Operation Sarp Vinash’, which caught the headlines in May 2003. Later, that year a unilateral declaration of cease fire, along the Line of Control by Pakistan, and the ferocity of operation reduced considerably.


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